"Not since that time nearly 2000 years ago, when Archimedes reflected the sun's rays to set the Roman fleet on fire, has the world seen a weapon that puts fresh meaning into the phrase 'in real time'. Let's do it now in flight," thus Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, the Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), exhorted a crowd of missile defense engineers at a function in Wichita, Kansas last week. The event was the roll-out of a redesigned Boeing 747 aircraft that would integrate a revolutionary technology yet to be witnessed by modern age - an airborne laser weapon interdicting and zapping missiles in mid-air.
When the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or the Star Wars programme of the early 1980s fantasized the idea of space-based laser weapons shooting down enemy missiles, it was taunted by critics as the best of science fiction. The MDA and its technology contractors are now working overtime to prove them wrong and give life to a technology which would in all likelihood be the most distinct product of the current revolution in military affairs. After the demise of the SDI and its partial regeneration through the National Missile Defense (NMD) programme, the high-energy laser weapon project had gained new life in the form of the Airborne Laser (ABL) programme, which would be another major component of NMD.
The primary goal of the project was to create a weapon system consisting of a high-energy, chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL) mounted on a modified Boeing 747 aircraft to shoot down ballistic missiles in their boost phase. A four-member crew in the aircraft would operate the airborne laser in pairs at high altitudes of around 40,000 feet, by flying in orbits over friendly territory and scanning the horizon for the plumes of rising missiles. With its precision-targeting and quick-reaction objectives, the ABL system would be designed for autonomous operations, which would include the capabilities to acquire and track missiles in the boost phase of flight and destroy them.
An Airborne Laser mission begins when one or more of its six infrared sensors detect the heat from the plume of a hostile launched missile. One laser locks onto the missile to provide preliminary tracking data. The aircraft's onboard computer system measures the distance and calculates its course and direction. The second laser illuminates the missile, determines the aim-point of the target, while the third laser measures the atmospheric disturbance between the aircraft and the missile so that computers and deformable mirrors can compensate for the amount of refraction the laser beam will encounter on its way to the target. Finally, the Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser fires along a computer-determined path, concentrating sufficient energy on the missile's metal skin to destroy the boosting missile over its launch area. Boeing, as the prime contractor for ABL, would provide the modified aircraft and battle management system, and function as overall systems integrator. Other ABL partners are Northrop Grumman, which supplies the high-energy laser and the beacon illuminator laser, and Lockheed Martin, which provides the nose-mounted turret in addition to the beam control/fire control system.
Since the 1980's when the US first toyed with this technology and after the 1996 rebirth of the project, developing that big idea of using lasers from a flying platform to destroy missiles in the boost stage seemed a near-impossible task. Keeping the Airborne Laser's weight down was a persistent challenge throughout, especially when over 1,200 gallons of chemicals were needed to fire the laser. The other challenges were to ensure the desired effective range of the laser and also successfully integrate the system within an aircraft. On the other hand, the ABL project, which started with development costs of $2.5 billion and intended fielding in 2006 had to consistently revise its estimates. As a result, in February 2006, the programme was relegated by the Pentagon to a technology demonstrator status, and the ABL team was asked to solely focus on a flight test to shoot down a target missile. Earlier, the project had barely scraped through a cancellation threat in 2004 after the Pentagon decided to lay down several interim test milestones for the programme, which included a flight-test of the aircraft fitted with battle-management and fire-control systems, and a brief firing of the chemical laser on the ground. At a critical Block 2004 test, a team led by Boeing successfully fired for the first time a laser dubbed as the 'First Light' in November 2004. Though the firing lasted only a fraction of a second, it gave the project an important boost amid calls for cancellation.
The ABL project is currently moving forward in two-year development "blocks." In July 2002, the prototype 747, known as YAL-1A, made its first test flight. Since 2004, the agency has undertaken many developmental tests to prove the power and firing duration of the Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL), which could sufficiently destroy a boosting missile from hundreds of miles away. Also, in the past two years, it had completed flight testing of the Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence system; the sensor system; and major components of the optical system. The tasks for Block 2006 were to deploy the ABL aircraft and prove the laser system's efficacy. Prior to the 2004 tests, 'knowledge points' were laid out to measure the programme's progress. With a budget of over $471.6 million, the knowledge points laid out for 2006 included testing of solid-state lasers for missile tracking and atmospheric-distortion correction. The ground-based tests were conducted in June 2006 when "surrogate" lasers were successfully fired from the interior of modified Boeing 747 on to an NKC-135 aircraft with a picture of a ballistic missile painted on its fuselage at a Boeing facility in Wichita. Though these tests proved the laser system was sound, more ground-based tests and laser hardware integration with the aircraft might happen in 2007 for which MDA has already requested $631 million.
With the success of recent tests and rollout of the redesigned Boeing 747 400F aircraft on October 27, the decks are now cleared for a steady development plan and the crucial flight-testing in 2008. However, even though the MDA has demonstrated the laser technology on the ground, the primary challenge would be to prove the capability of the laser system to shoot down a boosting missile during flight. While an airborne aircraft firing a high-power chemical oxide laser along with other beams would be a challenging endeavour, there are also concerns on whether adequate laser energy can be generated to overcome atmospheric absorption and then focus on a small point to damage a missile. Already, the project has faced a 'jitter' problem typical to Boeing 747s. And this becomes a serious issue since even small vibrations can have detrimental effects on laser weapons, which must focus a high-powered beam of light on a rapidly moving target and maintain the beam's intensity. For this reason, the stabilization of the laser is essential, and the programme cannot move forward until the ABL team perfects its Lockheed Martin-designed beam/fire control system, which is designed to compensate for 'jitter.'
For that matter, even a successful test in 2008 might not convince critics, since that test will be at relatively close range and intentionally designed to demonstrate system functionality rather than to determine its capability in a stressful setting. Also critics have cited the inadequacies in tackling counter-measures as a major technical hurdle for the project. The ABL has been positioned as a competitor to the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), another boost-phase missile defense system slated for flight test in 2008. With the MDA officials indicating that only one of these programmes might eventually survive, the 2008 demonstration would be heavily critical for the future of the ABL programme. Like other BMD programmes including the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defence System (GMDS), the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the KEI, the ABL project has also heavily overshot its intended budget and has incurred about $1 billion in cost overruns and is estimated to cost another billion before the system is ready for final testing.
Though the MDA was planning to design a second ABL aircraft in 2007, as part of the five ABL aircraft package, it had to defer that until the 2008 test. If the 2008 demonstration is successful, it might be followed by tests to shoot down longer-range missiles. However, at stake now is the future of not just the ABL project, but also the whole BMD programme, which had seen repeated failures and tremendous cost outruns. On September 15, a ground-interception test for the THAAD system was aborted after malfunctions in the target missile. However, an earlier test of the GMD system on September 1 gave hope after an interceptor launched from the Vandenberg Base hit a target launched from Alaska. This was the first successful test after a series of failures on the GMDS since October 2002. Amid this sullied record, the rollout of the ABL aircraft was a shot-in-the-arm for the MDA, which has faced all-round criticism from Congressmen, analysts and academics who question the feasibility of missile defences and the billions going down with failed systems.
It may have seemed ironic that Russia, the erstwhile archenemy of western military alliance was hosting, in St Petersburg earlier this year, the summit meeting of G-8, the epitome of western riches and power. But it was truly reflective of the spirit of our times. For India, which was invited along with China and some others as outreach countries, it was an opportunity to share the big stage. A closer look at the dynamics in evidence at the G-8 would suggest that the world strategic landscape is constantly evolving and it would be useful for us to reflect on where exactly are we headed.
With the demise of cold war, we are moving towards multi-polarity even though USA might prolong its unipolar reign somewhat. But how many poles exactly would the emergent world order stabilize with? We are in an extremely dynamic world where an increasing number of countries and regional groupings are capable of seriously impacting on the global affairs. Where do we draw the line? USA and China are obviously two most powerful countries today. European Union, despite its lack of hom*ogeneity and contradictions after the entry of central and eastern European states is a fairly dominant entity particularly if one were to look at its economic leverages. Japan, being the second largest economy, has an obvious place on the high table. Russia's resurgence under President Putin with rising oil revenues already stands confirmed and the west which was seen rushing into writing its obituary just a few years back may have to face some degree of embarrassment on that front. World has also begun to take notice of India because of its sustained high growth rates and leadership role in the human resources area particularly in the IT and other high technology sectors. Is that all: six big powers; six poles? But, do we leave out Brazil, which is the largest country in the South American continent. What about the Arab and the Moslem world, which is even clamouring for a permanent seat in the expanded Security Council? And, are we to remain permanently dismissive towards Africa? South Africa, which along with India and Brazil has already made the South-South cooperation a reality both in political and economic arena, definitely wants to be counted in. To assign a finite number to power centres in the world of tomorrow appears irrational and an attempt to fit the present day complex realities into an anachronistic framework.
Truth is that the classical balance of power theories of the last two centuries appear too simplistic and can no longer adequately explain the current dynamism in inter- state relations. Problem lies in our mindset. We are always seeking to interpret the future trends in terms of frameworks known to us - on the basis of our past experience. We generally relate the balance of power to the cold war context and also the manner in which opposing groups of countries were ranged against each other in the 19th and pre-war 20th century. Cold war was characterized by division of the world into two hostile camps led by USA and Soviet Union competing for ideological supremacy and dominance. The fact that a large number of countries including India were subscribing to the non-aligned movement in rejection of this division did not really disturb that balance since these countries did not enjoy much military significance in the scheme of things. Rising German power had also led to creation of some kind of balance of power in the early twentieth century. However, the first attempt at establishing a balance of power in Europe was the Congress of Vienna in 1814 after the Napoleonic wars had devastated the continent. It represented willingness on the part of major powers to develop an 'equilibrium of forces' amongst them in order to dampen competition. There were two opposing camps: liberal camp comprising of England and France; and, conservative camp consisting of Russia, Prussia and Austria. But there was constant collaboration and 'inter-penetration' between the two camps. This arrangement lasted for nearly four decades.
The present day world hardly appears to be comparable to either of the above two models. It rather seems to be a throwback to the eighteenth century Europe, which was characterized by 'unregulated competition' except that we no longer have the luxury of an ever-expanding pie. The world is also far more dispersed today unlike those days when all the power was concentrated in Europe. Today we have a far bigger stage; far too many players. Indeed, our world is beginning to resemble an amorphous, rounded structure where lines of division into distinct competing groups and areas of influence are getting blurred. In that sense we are far more unstructured today as compared to the situation obtaining during the cold war. Are we headed for a truly non-aligned world?
Communication revolution has dramatically transformed our world. As individuals we are no longer restricted to the confines of our geographical frontiers - the whole world is our stage! The resulting phenomenon of globalisation has led to the growth of political liberalism and transfusion of cultures around the world. There has been manifold increase in the volume of international commerce, which is solely driven by the considerations of profits and growth. The mammoth trans-national corporations whose operations straddle different nooks and corners of the globe are mainly concerned with ensuring adequate returns for their shareholders. They cannot have any narrow national loyalties since the ownership patterns are fairly spread out. Commercial considerations have begun to play an increasingly important role in how countries relate to one another. It is, for instance, not uncommon for Heads of States or Governments to take large business delegations with them on their overseas official trips and to make strong sales pitch at the highest levels on issues of pressing concern. Business interests, on the other hand, have also begun to seriously impact on the making of foreign policies of powerful countries. Thus for example, after the nuclear tests by India in May 1998 there was a sharp negative reaction by the American government causing the Indo-US official relations to hit the rock bottom but, thanks to powerful business lobbies in both the countries, these relations were back to normal in less than two years.
There is also increasing spotlight on the issues of governance, human rights and the quality of life of the general public. In these circ*mstances, states may be unwilling to accept any self-imposed restraints on relations with one another. All these factors have impelled states to increasingly adopt broad based multi-vectoral approaches in managing their relations with others with the sole aim of optimising the benefits of such engagements. Pragmatic considerations rather than ideological predilections are driving the foreign policies of countries. In these circ*mstances attempt by any country to apply a rigid 'for or against' construct in defining its relationship with others is obviously somewhat anachronistic.
Opportunities for cooperation amongst states have not only risen manifold but there is also evidence of a growing recognition worldwide that cooperation is indeed imperative to effectively deal with emerging non-traditional security threats in diverse areas ranging from terrorism and organized crime to environmental degradation and spread of diseases. Countries could deal with traditional military threats by augmenting their own defence capabilities and in that sense response tactics had to be mainly developed on the basis of national priorities and resources but the new non-conventional threats can not be effectively tackled without concerted collective action globally or at least on a regional basis, as our experience in the current global war against terrorism shows. Al Qaeda operates a global network of terrorist organizations and no nation, howsoever powerful, can deal with it single-handedly. Maritime security issues are also forcing the countries to come together in a manner not seen earlier. Today if we appear better prepared for safeguarding Malacca Straits, that has only been possible due to conviction amongst littoral states as regards the need to strengthen regional and multi-lateral defence cooperation instrumentalities.
Emergence of powerful non-state actors with extensive global networks has completely altered our security scenario and threat perception. Military threats have retreated into the background yielding space to threats from these non-traditional sources. This has quite obviously impacted on the relevance of military power even though there may still be some inveterate hardliners unwilling to accept this changing reality. Henry Kissinger was quite prophetic when he wrote in his famous book titled Diplomacy many years ago that "power has become more diffuse and the issues to which military force is relevant have diminished." It follows from this that there may not be much point in countries equipping their armies with heavy tanks or for that matter in maintaining large infantry manpower when the possibility of conventional wars itself has declined. Scarce and finite resources should rather be channelled into preparing them better to deal with low intensity campaigns being waged all over the world and the threats which virtually all the countries face from terrorists both within and outside.
It would be naive to dismiss the emerging picture as liberal idealism or mere idle talk. We may perhaps still be in the throes of transition - 'the period of gestation' for the emerging world order, but there is pressing need for us to develop a new construct to fully comprehend the evolving landscape and to synchronize our policies with the changing times.
When we look at the scenario in East Asia, there are China and India both of which are rising powers with high-sustained growth rates. There are other big powers - Japan with its large economic power has considerable military potential, and USA which still has a lot of interest in the region. There are bound to be other players as well. The recent nuclear test by North Korea is bound to give rise to lot of anxiety in the region and could unleash an altogether new security dynamics, resulting in possible new military build up which would have destabilizing impact on the region and beyond. Korean test is also yet another example of the failure of the non-proliferation regime and underscores the need to proceed earnestly with the agreed goal of nuclear disarmament, which is complete elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Nothing short of it would be able to provide international community credible security guarantees on the nuclear front.
In keeping with the emerging construct in international relations, as outlined above, India is seeking to develop close relations with each of the major powers in the East Asian region - in a manner that its relationship with one country does not impinge negatively upon its relationship with the others. Thus, for instance, India has been developing closer relations with the US in the recent months as evidenced by the proposed civil nuclear cooperation deal, significance of which extends far beyond the energy cooperation. While this is generally welcome in India, there is also at the same time , a broad agreement that India should not get drawn into any grand strategy that America might have for containing China. There is recognition that India's interest would be best served by developing strategic partnership with both China and US as well as the other major powers, simultaneously, on an equal footing in a mutually non-exclusively manner with self-confidence becoming of a big power.
As far as China is concerned India is seeking to develop a cooperative framework of bilateral relationship. From India's standpoint, however China is most important. By working together in a cooperative framework, both countries can contribute significantly towards creating a better and more conducive environment for growth of trade and investment leading to better quality of life for the people in the region. Other countries would also benefit from the positive synergies. Tensions on the other hand would impact adversely on the fortunes of both India and China as well as other countries of the region. While it is only natural for India and China to have some competition and even rivalry but care would need to be taken by both of them to ensure that that does not degenerate into conflict and confrontation. India on its part has taken necessary steps to normalize relations with China through initiatives to develop trade, investment and people-to-people linkages, despite unresolved border dispute, which has led to a huge bilateral trade turnover expected to cross US $ 20 billion mark shortly. Incidentally, India has also suggested the same approach to Pakistan, its other neighbour, which requires removing the spotlight from the tricky issues and focusing rather on confidence building exercise through extensive people-to people linkages. But, Pakistan continues to harp on the necessity for a solution of Kashmir before moving forward with normalization of relations with India in any meaningful and sincere manner. That 'all or nothing' approach is hardly practical. India has also shown sensitivity to Chinese concerns on critical issues of Taiwan and Tibet. China on its part also needs to show accommodation to Indian sensitivities in our neighbourhood and to play a supportive role for realization of India's legitimate aspirations to join UNSC as a permanent member. It is important that both countries do everything necessary to build greater trust and cooperation for the sake of prosperity and development in the East Asia region.
China's cautious approach to defusing the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis underscores the dilemmas that exist in its difficult relationship with North Korea on the one hand and its interests with respect to the United States on the other. What worries China more is North Korea's ambition and intention to further continue its nuclear programme. Moreover, China faces a daunting task in tackling the increasing American pressure to intensify actions against North Korea as per the UNSC resolutions. There is no doubt that China is weighing tough measures to prohibit North Korea from further nuclear tests. But the recent inspection of cargo trucks bound for North Korea by Chinese customs inspectors have raised doubts about whether China would enforce the inspections in accordance to UNSC norms. In a reply to international observers on the allegations that China is not following UNSC resolution norms for "inspections", China's UN ambassador Wang Guangya commented: "I think different countries will do it different ways." This statement clearly shows the ambivalence in the Chinese approach to the North Korean crisis. Because, on October 15, it was with the consent of China that the UNSC passed a resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea after it was modified and redefined to eliminate the explicit mention of "military enforcement".
A careful analysis of the initial Chinese response to the North Korean nuclear test reveals that it was strong though typically cautious. In an immediate response to the October 9 nuclear test, Wang Guangya said that the Security Council must deliver "punitive actions" against North Korea, but it should be a "firm, constructive, appropriate but prudent response". Chinese reservations on this UNSC resolution are an interesting aspect of this episode relating to international reactions to the nuclear test. China made it very clear that it is "firmly against" military actions and has been very skeptical about the provisions of the resolutions which mention "cargo going into and out of North Korea." This measured response reflects the cautious approach of Chinese diplomacy. It is interesting to note that on the one hand, China wants to maintain good relations - and at least some influence over the North Korea, while on the other hand, it wants to prevent Kim Jong Il from triggering a nuclear conflict on China's border.
After the nuclear test, the Chinese government took a firm stand that any military action against North Korea is "unimaginable". It was also against a resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter since such a resolution, according to China, would contain a military trigger. But this initial cautious response reflects the same array of interests that drives the overall policy approach to the Korean peninsula that it has pursued since the end of the cold war. The weight of these Chinese interests, which reflects serious considerations for PRC security and economic prosperity, make China the most important player in the Korean peninsula.
Given these fundamental interests, 'peace and stability' has been the key in China's stance on the North Korean crisis, and this priority forms the baseline in Beijing's recent official statements on the North Korean nuclear test. In the service of these priorities, China has pressed two tactics consistently on North Korean issues: first, no military action against North Korea and a peaceful diplomatic solution to the crisis; and second, return to the Six-Party talks again. By taking this stand, China hopes to convey a message to international watchers that as a P-5 nation it shares the international community's denuclearization goal of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner. But in reality, China fears that a war between North Korea and the United States will hamper its own economy and security. Earlier at regular intervals, the Chinese government had opposed any kind of sanctions on North Korea because it feared that such a course would apart from bringing about instability in the region would also damage the nascent process of market reforms in, as well as its own economic relations with, North Korea. China is North Korea's chief supplier of food, energy and financial aid. In addition, Beijing does not want to see a humanitarian crisis in North Korea as a result of sanctions, for it is likely to send a lot of refugees into the northern part of China. Moreover, from a broader perspective, it has reasons to be concerned about its own quest for reunification with Taiwan, human rights issues in Xinjiang and Tibet, given increasing Western focus on issues relating to humanitarian crises.
From the bilateral perspective, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson had said in response to the test that "this will no doubt have a negative impact on China and North Korean's relations". Though at the moment when sanctions are already imposed it seems that it is a very difficult stage in the Sino-North Korean relationship, in future one can expect the relationship between the two old communist allies to remain as close as ever. At the moment it can be said that North Korea is acting assertively in its relationship with China. From the Chinese perspective, it may even be able to afford to live with a nuclear and powerful North Korea, because it is an important weapon against the United States. China, however, is concerned about Pyongyang's military moves starting an arms race in the region, which will give enough scope for Japan to strengthen its military. Another important aspect that has become a major concern for the Chinese after the sanctions is their nearly two-billion-dollar annual bilateral trade and investment with North Korea, which is clearly the most visible form of leverage that they possess to end the deadlock in the current crisis.
Given the Chinese interests on the Korean Peninsula sketched above, Beijing's cautious approach to the current crisis should not be surprising at all. It is in China's interest that the North Korean nuclear crisis is resolved through peaceful diplomacy and to maintain and preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula. On October 12, 2006, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao commented in a press conference that "…the measures to be taken should be helpful to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, maintain the peace and stability on the peninsula, and resume the Six-Party Talks". Added to this, on October 17, when US satellite images reported preparations for a second nuclear test by North Korea, the Chinese foreign ministry expressed its concerns by stating that "We hope North Korea will adopt a responsible attitude ... and come back to resolving the issue through dialogue and consultation instead of taking any actions that may further escalate or worsen the situation". The above-mentioned statements clearly show china's grave concerns and its cautious diplomatic approach. In fact, China's interest in maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula rests on the concern that a regime collapse in North Korea will have a serious impact on China. The Chinese are especially worried by the US military presence in South Korea, and in the wake of the North's collapse US influence could well spread up to the Yalu River on China's Southern border. At the moment, it is clear that the effective enforcement of UN sanctions depends a lot on China.
The North Korean act of conducting an underground nuclear test has exposed the inherent limitations of various international institutions. It has also posed a challenge for the US as to how to make China behave as a responsible 'stakeholder' in international politics. If Beijing could not restrain Kim Jong-Il's regime from flagrantly conducting a nuclear test in disregard of the combined opposition of the international community, Pyongyang has created a complex political atmosphere, which needs China to deliver considerably to bring the current crisis to an end.
No doubt, North Korea still has more surprises in store for the international community. It already has indicated that it might go for more nuclear tests and Pyongyang has rejected the idea of coming to terms with UN Security Council resolution of October 14, 2006. No matter how scientifically successful the North Korean nuclear test was or whether Pyongyang is capable of mating the weapon with delivery systems, the neighbouring territories in northeast Asia fall well within the range of its already successfully tested missiles. Pyongyang also poses as a dangerous source of nuclear and missile proliferation.
North Korea clandestinely pursued a nuclear weapons programme for many decades. Despite being a member of the NPT since 1985 and a signatory to the IAEA's fullscope safeguards, which allowed for international inspections to detect diversion of nuclear efforts towards military purposes, North Korea could not be tamed in time. Its withdrawal from the NPT and actual conduct of a nuclear test has exposed the inherent weaknesses of the NPT in the face of non-proliferation challenges. The North Korean defiance occurred when the international community was still grappling with the mystery related to the Pakistan based A.Q. Khan proliferation network, which facilitated the illicit nuclear weapon programmes of NPT members like Libya, Iran, and North Korea.
The next immediate worry is whether Iran will follow North Korea and make the NPT implode? In reality, the mishandling of the North Korean case is likely to stiffen Tehran's posture. At the same time, Iran would be carefully watching the unfolding events over North Korea. And unlike in the case of the already isolated North Korean regime, Iran's economic stakes are closely linked with many, including EU countries, Japan, Russia and China.
In the case of North Korea, China holds the largest share of Pyongyang's external trade in terms of both imports and exports, including food and fuel supply. Yet, according to a recent study, China would suffer the least, in comparison with South Korea and Japan, in terms of the direct economic impact of the international fallout of an already impoverished Pyongyang's nuclear test. The instability in the Korean peninsula may well result in capital flight mainly from South Korea and Japan, though this can be effectively regulated. The study, conducted by a Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics in July 2006, had rightly pointed out that a North Korean test would likely have a negative, though non-catastrophic, economic impact on the region. Even after two weeks of the October 9 test, no significant adverse impact is visible in the region.
The security implications, however, are immense for North Korea's neighbours, particularly South Korea and Japan. They might review their policy of 'reliance' on the US nuclear security umbrella or being to ponder over an alternative military 'self-reliance' route in the coming years. If Japan opts for developing its own nuclear weapons and delivery systems, it would be the last nail in the coffin of NPT. The US could hardly afford to allow this to happen.
China has shown scant regard in the past for its own NPT commitments though it now gives importance to the NPT regime for political, military and nuclear trade gains flowing from the treaty related international arrangements. China would do its best to join hands with the United States for its own security interest to stop any country in northeast Asia going nuclear, especially Japan.
But how would China handle the North Korean brinkmanship to prevent the deterioration of regional security or a possible arms race in the future? It is difficult to find a readymade reply. China may opt to play cautiously so as not to outrage its worthy strategic partner, Pyongyang, for otherwise the latter could provoke further instability in the Asian security realm.
Till now China has attempted to create nuclear and missile armed regional actors against the wishes of the US to keep it perpetually engaged in strategic adjustments with China. Also, by arming North Korea and Pakistan, China kept its potential regional challengers, Japan and India, contained. Particularly, China has long maintained the status quo in North Korea in the hope of using it as a bargaining chip for its interests in Taiwan. In reality, the Chinese efforts towards denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula have not shown any signs of success so far. China also politically managed not to let North Korea's direct consultations with the US from affecting its leverage over Pyongyang.
Since North Korea has pulled its nuclear trump, little is left for it to hide except unpredictable dictatorial irrationalities. Chinese policy towards Pyongyang has come under international scrutiny, especially its support for the North Korean regime in the past. The international community expects Beijing to play a responsible role and not to let the crisis worsen further. Any miscalculation in matching the expectations of the international community may now cost China dearly in terms of its economic ties and technology trade with Europe and the US, including the approximately US $100 billion worth investments in Iranian oil and gas resources. In addition, Beijing may face difficulties in stopping consequential militarization in the neighbouring countries, including the potential intensification of American military engagement in Taiwan or elsewhere.
China will have to face many risks by delaying to respond to North Korean belligerence. Yet, China will be hesitant to lose a longstanding and dependent ally with which it has cultivated a relationship for over five decades with proven strategic dividends. Beijing is likely to cooperate in implementing the UN Security Council resolution against North Korea, though with controlled moderation.
In May 2002, the then US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton, in his speech at the Heritage Foundation had accused Cuba of having a limited offensive biological warfare programme. But a cursory examination of history shows that the Cubans were in fact 'victims' of American 'germ' attacks in the past.
Between the 1960s and 1990s, Cuba has been subjected to an enormous number of outbreaks of human and crop diseases, which are difficult to attribute purely to natural causes. In the backdrop of the recent pandemic of Dengue in India and its neighbourhood, it would be of interest to note that during 1981 Cuba was in the grip of Dengue, which was probably intentionally spread by the Americans. Naturally, such accusations mostly emerge from the victim country and it is not necessary that the complainant should always be correct in its assessment.
However, Cuba had a reason to point a finger at the United States. Cuban officials felt that there was enough circ*mstantial evidence available to prove their contention. During the 1960s, the United States intentionally attacked Cuban agriculture many times. According to a Washington Post report of September 16, 1977, the CIA had maintained an "anticrop warfare" programme. In 1970 the CIA engineered the introduction of African swine fever into Cuba, which killed more than a half million pigs. Subsequently, The Guardian and a few other Western newspapers reported extensively on these operations. Thus, in short, there was a history of US usage of agriculture/biological weapons against Cuba.
Moreover, in the spring and summer of 1981, the Cubans found themselves facing an unprecedented epidemic of hemorrhagic Dengue fever. The epidemic, which had hit Cuba in May 1981, generated serious suspicions about American involvement because the country did not have much of a history of major Dengue outbreaks (except for 1944 and 1977). But suddenly between May and October 1981 there were more than three lakh reported cases and 158 fatalities. At the peak of the epidemic, more than 10,000 cases per day were being reported.
Experts say that diseases like Dengue are ideal as biological warfare weapons for many reasons. First, Dengue is highly incapacitating and it can be transmitted easily through the introduction of infected mosquitoes. Second, it spreads rapidly and hence, as a weapon, it can cover a larger target area. Third, the Dengue mosquito bites during the day when people are more active and less protected; moreover, under favourable wind conditions, these mosquitoes can travel hundreds of miles. In such cases, population density and hygiene conditions also become instrumental in deciding the extent to which the disease spreads. Lastly, since dengue fever is found in nature very easily in many parts of the world, a human role in its spread is hard to detect thus enabling an attacker to easily hide its role.
Many technical reports indicated the probability that the 1981 Cuba epidemic had been artificially induced. It had begun at three different localities at once, which is highly unusual in a natural outbreak. None of the victims from these localities had a history of travel to a Dengue-infected place. Wind conditions at that time were not favourable for mosquitoes to travel the distances involved within that short time. And, most importantly, the fever had spread at an astonishingly and theoretically unimaginable rate.
Furthermore, technically the Americans were capable of using Dengue as a biological weapon. In fact, laboratory manufactures of Dengue fever variations were the focus of much experimentation at the US Army's Biological Warfare test facility at Fort Dietrick, Maryland, prior to the 'ban' on such research in 1972.
Interestingly, in India in the year 1975 a decision was taken by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to close down a US sponsored mosquito research project. As a part of the project, a massive release of "Aedes aegypti" mosquitoes (they transmit yellow and dengue fevers) in Sonepat district in Haryana was planned. The aim was to understand mosquito biting habits and a few other details. The then Indian government had taken the decision to scrap this project fearing that the Americans may be interested in testing their biological weapons under the grab of this experiment. This decision was vindicated when the US Defence Department declassified documents listing 46 secret biological and chemical weapons tests conducted at the height of the Cold War. And one of these was a similar project on Baker Island in the South Pacific as part of the biological weapons research programme. In one such trial, codenamed Magic Sword, Aedes aegypti mosquitoes were released off the coast of Baker Island to obtain information on mosquito biting habits, mosquito trap technology and operational and logistical problems associated with the delivery of mosquitoes to remote sites.
As pointed out earlier, the Sonepat project had similar aims. Moreover, the experiment was planned on a very large scale, designed to release hundreds of thousands of mosquitoes reared at a special facility in New Delhi which had been built with funds from the US Public Health Service routed through the World Health Organization (WHO). Significantly, different standards were employed by the US for the Baker Island and Sonepat experiments. Baker Island was uninhabited and distant from the mainland, the trial was conducted with the help of informed volunteers and the mosquitoes were eradicated at the end of the trial. No such plans existed for thickly populated Sonepat and even the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) was unaware of the real intent behind this experiment.
However, experimentation with Dengue should not be treated as simply a relic of the past. In 2001, British researchers pled guilty to charges that they improperly handled a genetically engineered hybrid of the viruses causing hepatitis C and dengue fever. These researchers, under unsafe laboratory conditions, deliberately created 'Dengatitis' during their experimentation for a vaccine for hepatitis C. Luckily, no spread of infection was noticed in spite of a variant of Dengue being in the air over a limited area for some time.
All the above mentioned facts corroborate the observation that is normally made about biological weapons that it is difficult to identify the usage of biological weapon until and unless the predator announces it; otherwise a pandemic would always be identified as a vagary of nature. During the last few decades, particularly after the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention came into force, Biological Weapons have generally come to be perceived as history. Even their use by terrorist organisations has been rated as minuscule. However, during the last few years, South and Southeastern parts of Asia have witnessed major disease spreads like SARS and bird flu. The recent outbreaks of Dengue in countries like India and Pakistan are indicative of the fact that the region may remain in 'health turmoil'. The need of the hour is to strengthen the public health infrastructure, which is the best way to handle 'health disasters' irrespective of whether these are manmade or natural outbreaks.
China and Japan issued a joint communiqué in Beijing on October 8 during the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's first foreign visit, vowing to promote strategic relations between the two countries in the coming years. Both Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Abe hailed the visit as a positive turning point in Sino-Japanese relations. Abe's visit to China is politically important since it is the first meeting between the leaders of the two countries in the past five years. Beijing had earlier refused to hold any summit with the former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi because of his visits to the Yasukuni War Shrine. In the joint communiqué both countries agreed that improving bilateral relations especially on the economic front including energy, environmental protection and telecommunication sectors are among their most important diplomatic priorities. Though North Korea's nuclear explosion overshadowed the visit, the new phase of Sino-Japanese relations will not only have long-term significance for the region but would also promote energy co-operation in Northeast Asia.
There are two major issues on which Japan and China have squared off against each other in the past and both relate to energy. The first is the issue of China's alleged ongoing gas exploration in Chunxiao gas field in the bordering exclusive economic zones of both countries in the East China Sea. The second is the ongoing competition between the two countries for acquiring Siberian energy resources in Russia's Fareast.
The issue of Chunxiao gas field (Shirakaba gas field in Japanese) exploration in the East China Sea escalated into a dispute between Beijing and Tokyo ever since China unilaterally started natural gas exploration there. Japan fears that China's operations in this gas field could stretch into the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In early 2005, in response to China's gas exploration, Tokyo decided to grant exploration rights to a Japanese company Teikoku Oil to assert its right over the field. Subsequently, the two countries agreed to settle the issue through bilateral talks. The issue popped up once again when China's state-owned offshore oil company CNOOC started exploration in the field on January 28, 2006, shortly before a bilateral discussion was to be held on the issue. Despite the two governments agreeing to set up a working group of legal experts to work on the demarcation of their respective EEZs, no substantial solution has been worked out yet. Though the Japanese have earlier rejected joint gas explorations, the current joint communiqué might play a role in helping the two sides resume talks to reach some mutually agreeable terms for extraction of hydrocarbon reserves in the field. To many observers, the only pragmatic way to solve the issue is joint exploration given that China is extracting about 81.7 million barrels a day of oil-equivalent, natural gas and oil together.
The second issue concerns competition between the two countries for energy resources in Russia's Siberian region. Apart from their geographical proximity to Eastern Siberia, the huge untapped energy fields there with an estimated reserve of 18.8 billion barrels of oil and about 386 trillion cubic feet of gas, have been a major attraction for Tokyo and Beijing. There were persistent attempts by both Japan and China to woo Moscow to sign energy export contracts. While Beijing was interested in constructing a pipeline carrying about 400,000 barrels of oil (per day) from Angarsk in eastern Siberia to Daqing, the oldest oil field in China, Japan wanted Moscow to opt for a bigger pipeline carrying approximately 1 million barrels of oil (per day) to the Nakhodka Port in the Vladivostok province, from where oil shipments can be transported to Japan overnight.
On May 29, 2003 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Russia's Yukos Oil Company signed a deal paving the way for a US $2.5 billion oil pipeline across the border. Under the agreement, CNPC agreed to purchase up to 5.13 billion barrels of Russian oil between 2005 and 2030. Shortly after that, at a July 2003 meeting in Moscow between Japanese and Russian energy officials, the former made a counter offer of $7 billion as initial investment, with a promise to subsequently raise this figure to $15 billion to develop energy fields in Eastern Siberia and to construct a pipeline to Nakhodka port. Since the new offer appeared more lucrative for Moscow, Transneft, a state owned oil company in Russia, backed the Japanese proposal.
Within a few weeks, Russia expropriated Yukos and arrested its chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky on tax evasion charges. Since the expropriation of the company resulted in suspension of many contacts for new projects, Yukos' plans to construct the oil pipeline to China also witnessed a serious setback. Almost a year later, in September 2004, Transneft submitted a feasibility study report to Kremlin for the Nakhodka pipeline construction. With these developments in Russia, it appeared to many observers that the much-discussed trans-Siberian pipeline would be constructed to Nakhodka port and not to China's Daqing. However, a sudden twist in Moscow's energy export plan appeared when the Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing in early 2006 and signed three pacts on energy co-operation with China. Under these, Moscow will not only increase its oil exports but would also supply about 80 billion cubic metres of natural gas per year to China. Although Moscow and Beijing are yet to finalise the details of the pipeline and, most importantly, the price, this new deal seems to indicate Russia's preference for China over Japan. The deal is also expected to give Beijing an important role in energy development in Russia's Fareast.
To Moscow, China offers not only a huge market for its energy output but also an easy supply route. But choosing China as partner in the Siberian energy trade does not mean that Russia would ignore Japan in the long run in its energy trade to Asian markets. There are plans to extend the oil and gas pipelines to Nakhodka port either through Chinese territory or through Russian territory linking the Sakhalin supplies. But developing such networks would require many more years and close co-operation between prospective customers like China and Japan. What Tokyo has lost currently because of the Sino-Russian deal is not only immediate supplies of energy resources from Siberia, but also an upper hand in the production and exploration activities in the region, which would have provided considerable leverage to Japan's energy security activities in the region. Ever since China and Japan found themselves competing for Siberian energy sources, both have time and again tried to woo Moscow with huge financial offers. This had created a certain level of mutual suspicion about each other's lobbying with Moscow. Many observers feared that the China-Japan energy competition might reflect in other issues of bilateral concern such as the Senkaku-Diaoyutai island dispute. However, over the past few years, there has been wide criticism from both sides on the derailing of each other's energy ambitions in Siberia, which has resulted in both countries perceiving each other as rivals in the search for overseas energy.
Often, the Japan-China row over Siberian resources appeared to be more complex for policy makers in Japan as the whole issue largely depended on Moscow's decision about which country its energy exports should reach. While the Siberian energy resources are significant for China in terms of its geographical proximity, for Japan these resources would have made sense in economic terms in combination with its already existing exploration activities in Sakhalin Islands. Moreover, having exploration and developmental rights in the region would have helped Tokyo to gain considerable leverage over other prospective consumers of oil and gas in the region.
Despite the existing competition, there are various factors that necessitate cooperation between Japan and China in the region. First, although Beijing was successful in signing a deal with Russia, it is noticeable that Moscow was more successful in encashing on the China-Japan competition for obtaining higher price for energy exports. Second, Russia's Siberian region is relatively undeveloped compared to other energy fields. Hence, it would require large-scale investments and technological expertise to overcome geographical conditions. Third, given the similarity in China and Japan's energy interests, time is ripe for them to revisit the policy of distancing from each other in important aspects such as energy.
Regional energy cooperation was a hot topic in Japan and China before 2001, with many experts laying plans for a regional energy pipelines network from Russia's Fareast connecting China, Japan and the Koreas. But in the wake of Koizumi's Yasukuni visits, energy co-operation plans showed little progress. This period also saw energy issues escalating into disputes in the East China Sea and the rise of fierce competition over energy resources in the Russian Far East. Hence Abe's recent visit assumes greater importance in resuming top level bilateral relations and also to a certain extent in putting an end to mutual suspicion on issues of economic and territorial importance. According to the People's Daily (October 9, 2006), the visit indicated that the removal of political barriers to Sino-Japanese political relations and the resumption of high-level contact at an early date conform to the fundamental interests of the two countries and the aspirations of their people. An editorial in Japan Times (October 12, 2006) highlighted the point that the recent progress in bilateral relations will serve as a foundation for solving issues such as the disputes over exclusive economic zones with both China and South Korea, including joint development of natural gas resources with China in the East China Sea. It is also important to note that in the 'five-point proposal on developing future bilateral relations' made by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his talks with Abe, he suggested that the two countries should strengthen consultation on regional issues, promote regional co-operation in East Asia and contribute to the peace and development of Asia as a whole (Xinhua, October 8, 2006).
Hence, the joint communiqué issued by Japan and China is likely play a pivotal role in not only promoting bilateral relations but also help kick-start a well-developed bilateral co-operation framework to solve existing bilateral energy issues and conduct joint exploration in Eastern Siberia.
The underground nuclear test conducted by North Korea yesterday has established it as the ninth member of the nuclear club. There had been speculation, particularly since the failed test of a long-range missile, that North Korea would move to a nuclear test. It had warned about the impending test, and quite simply had nothing to lose. From a North Korean point of view, it was clear that the failed missile test demonstrated weakness and another missile test in the near term was unlikely to reduce international pressure on the regime. To North Korea that probably meant it needed to try something else, and a nuclear test was the only option to step things up a notch. For years, diplomats assumed that the North was using that ambiguity to trade away its nuclear capability for recognition, security guarantees, aid and trade with the West. But in the end, the country's reclusive leader, Kim Jong Il, seems to have given in to the concept of the army first doctrine or "Songun" which placed his regime's safety over all else. The immediate effect is that there is a lot of tough talking. In the long term there isn't realistically much that the rest of the world can do about this, given that the international community has very few options. What is clear is that the ninth member of the nuclear club is also the most unstable and could have been stopped. Nuclear proliferation by the Pakistan cartel, which speeded up the North Korean nuclear programme, was ignored by the global community, and a window of opportunity to negotiate away North Korea's bomb was ignored as well. The consequence - a nuclear North Korea that will change the security dynamics of the region.
North Korea has pursued its national interest of regime survival in a manner that will guarantee it - going nuclear! The American threat of a nuclear attack both during and after the Korean War may have shaped the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's decision to launch his own nuclear weapons programme. While the programme itself was begun in the 1960s with Soviet help, during the next two decades it was China that provided various kinds of support. A major milestone was achieved in 1986 when Pyongyang began operating the newly constructed 20 megawatt reactor near the city of Yongbyon.The CIA estimates that the Yongbyon reactor and the 700-800 MW reactor that is under construction at Taechon could together generate about 275 kilograms of plutonium per year if operated at full capacity.
Pyongyang's nuclear efforts received a boost from Pakistan and the 'father' of its nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who supplied enrichment equipment and perhaps even warhead designs. Khan who had shot to global notoriety for stealing nuclear technology from the Netherlands built up a global network of vendors and manufacturers to run a profitable nuclear black market from Pakistan. US intelligence agencies, which monitored Khan's network did little to halt the traffic, apparently because they did not wish to compromise sources and methods as well as not to jeopardize US-Pakistan relations. For what were evidently short-term gains, an opportunity to prevent nuclear proliferation was squandered.
The failure of the Bush administration to engage with the North is unlike the approach adopted by the previous Clinton administration, which aimed at getting Pyongyang to the negotiating table to work out a solution, even thought it was not terribly successful in this regard. President Bush's first-term policies failed to move North Korea towards the goal of disarmament and in fact proved counterproductive. Calling the North an "outpost of tyranny" and part of the "axis of evil" increased its already substantial fears and paranoia about the United States. Hardliners in the US administration believed that isolation, pressure and sanctions would cause the North to collapse and did not believe in rewarding it for any positive steps it might undertake. This resulted in the North Koreans expelling IAEA observers from Yongbyon in 2002 and removing 8,000 nuclear fuel rods that were under supervision. Its exit from the NPT in 2003 should have been a warning signal about its intent and lack of sincerity on negotiations. Instead, with the United States focused on Iraq, the window of opportunity to force Pyongyang to agree to the termination of its nuclear programme was lost.
The Seventh EU-India Summit will be held on October 13th in Helsinki. The annual summits take place alternately in New Delhi and in the capital of the incumbent European Union presidency - at present held by Finland - under the existing framework of EU-India relationship, which was given the shape of a 'strategic partnership' at the EU-India Summit of 2004 in The Hague. The Joint Action Plan (JAP) adopted at the New Delhi Summit in 2005 was a comprehensive programme of EU-India engagement in the coming years. As the EU-India strategic partnership has started to attract interest in Europe, India and at the international level, it would be pertinent to carry out an overview of this strategic partnership on the eve of the summit.
Before the EU-India strategic partnership came into being, India had been maintaining bilateral strategic partnerships with major European nations like Britain, France and Germany for a few years. Recent events show that major European nations are indeed interested in intensifying their bilateral engagements with India: be it India as the theme of the recently concluded International Book Fair in Frankfurt, the British Strategy Paper for 2015, which earmarks India and China as the focus, or the visit of the Indian Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, to France and Germany in early September 2006. Given this trend of an intensified bilateral relationship with European majors, some pertinent questions need to be posed. Does the EU-India relationship really deserve the attention and toil of the foreign policy makers in India? Is the EU, a 25-member juggernaut which will include two more nations, Bulgaria and Romania, in January 2007, really going somewhere? Moreover as basic notions of a global organisation or a political entity is seen from this part of the world, the most vital question is whether the EU is indeed a power (read militarily) or is it one in the making? The prevailing perception about the above-mentioned questions would be negative as both the referenda in France and in the Netherlands in the summer of 2005 were against a more cohesive EU - in the form of a European Constitution - and the bitter controversy around the EU budget in late 2005. One may describe these negative developments as symptoms of 'Euroschlerosis'.
Developments in the last year and the unresolved issues may also add to the fuzziness of the future of the union. Issues worth mentioning in this context include: the long and prolonged debate on Turkey's membership; German Chancellor Angela Merkel's support to a reference to 'Christianity' in a revised European Constitution; Britain's restriction of access to skilled workers from Romania and Bulgaria, despite the two countries being full members of the EU. The British decision to control migration from those two new members actually emanates from the statistics that the number of immigrants from these new member states has increased more than twenty times in the last year alone. This is a reflection of the anxiety over 'Polish plumbers' which partially contributed towards the rejection of a European Constitution in France last year. Therefore, strategic experts influenced by these cross-purposeful developments, may come to the conclusion that the EU has indeed reached a rudderless situation.
Nevertheless, those who observe the sophistication of the EU's working procedures would be overwhelmed by the daily volume of business completed by the basic EU institutions, namely the European Commission in Brussels, the European Parliament in Strasbourg, Brussels and Luxembourg, and the incumbent EU presidencies. At a more practical level, there is also criticism against the expensive translations of basic EU documents from English to Slovenian or from French to Latvian and travelling allowances for EU officialdom as a burden on the European taxpayers. Differences of vision also prevail amongst the major European political groups who want to see the EU to be developed in accordance with their respective ideological moorings - red, green, Christian or liberal. However, the distinctiveness of the EU lies in the flexibility to arrive at a decision mostly based on consensus amongst its member nations. For observers from other parts of the globe it is undeniably an experience where continuous compromise is achieved amongst 25-plus member nations on a daily basis in almost all aspects of European lives. Therefore, without being aware of the complexities of the EU and its nitty-gritty, sweeping comments and juxtaposing EU with the US, in order to prove the former's non-viability as a military bloc, are only indicative of the observers' unwillingness to get into pain-staking details of the EU and thus superficially following Robert Kagan's hypothesis that the United States is from Mars while Europe is from Venus.
However, as far as India's engagement with the EU is concerned, it has shown willingness to go beyond the 'traditional trajectories' in its foreign policy and thus engage almost all parts of the world. Economic diplomacy has become the major component in this endeavour. As the election manifestos in 2004 of both the major electoral combines in India, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), were unambiguous in giving due importance to the EU, it is obvious that at the political level there exists a consensus in considering the EU as a global power to be reckoned with. Not only there exists political consensus, there is also an increasing interest about the EU among the public and media, which could not be imagined even five years ago. The EU today, with a population of more than 450 million, a strong common currency in the Euro, a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $13 trillion (in 2006), economically and technologically competitive production regions throughout the continent and growing irrelevance of national borders, does in fact offer enormous opportunities for Indian trade and industry. On the other hand, the EU has also been observing the economic and technological growth of India and its expanding middle class over the last decade and major European brands are keen to enter the Indian consumer market.
In fact, trade is found to be the main driving force of the present Indo-EU relationship. Indian trade and industry have not only invested in Western Europe but also made their presence felt in Central and East European countries (CEEC), which so far remain unexplored as an investment destination. Indian majors like Kirolskar, TCS, and Dabur have already started their operations in East European nations like Hungary and Romania. However, there are also problem areas in this arena. For instance, the EU has complained about high Indian duties on European wines. For its part, India complains about visa restrictions faced by Indian businessmen and discrimination against Indian professionals in Europe. This issue can be addressed through the mechanism of the proposed Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Agreement (CECA), the signing of which would provide a boost to India-EU ties.
Technological cooperation remains one of the main pillars of the Indo-EU strategic partnership. Be it Indian participation in the EU global navigation system, Galileo, or membership in International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor [ITER] project, both India and EU have been engaging each other with greater vigour. Not only at the EU level, but also individual member nations and European defence industry in the last year have started their businesses in India or have shown willingness to participate in defence co-production. A EU-India Aviation Summit, which follows the Helsinki Summit, would address the new challenges in civilian aircraft technology.
However, the most important and interesting thing would be the outcome of the coming summit in the area of EU-India co-operation to combat terror. As India has been experiencing both home-grown and cross-border terrorist attacks - the latest manifestations being Mumbai and Malegaon - Europe is also facing the scourge. In fact both the two previous EU-India summits were held in the background of terrorist attacks. The EU-India Joint Action Plan of 2005 has therefore resolved to establish contacts between the Indian and EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinators. In this regard, it must be mentioned that the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator is a new post that came into existence after the Madrid terrorist attacks on March 11, 2004. Gijs de Vries, the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, does not have the power or the enormous mandate that his counterparts in other countries have. Therefore in the coming months it would be interesting to observe whether EU member nations take it as a priority to strengthen the institution of EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, which would definitely reinforce European co-operation with other governments in the campaign against terror. It is therefore expected that till the institution of EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator gets a full-fledged mandate, India would follow the existing bilateral frameworks with European nations in the form of Joint Working Groups on Terrorism.
In conclusion, it must be reiterated that the EU-India relationship is a rather innovative one in comparison to India's time-tested relationships with major European nations. However, in a short span of time, the EU-India relationship has shown tremendous potential in various areas. Given the multicultural nature of both the EU and India they share common concerns and have already decided to learn from each other's experiences. Similarly, India and the EU are also devoted to multilateral approaches towards current global challenges. It must therefore be remembered that any analysis of the challenges in the EU-India strategic partnership should be undertaken giving due consideration to the complex but dynamic EU integration process, the interlinking of different EU institutions in a specific decision and the daily challenges the EU faces as a unique organisation.
On September 25 and 26, 2006, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, conducted a seminar on Peace and Development in the North East in Shillong, Meghalaya. This was done in collaboration with the North Eastern Council (NEC) and the North Eastern Hill University (NEHU), Shillong. The two-day seminar provided a forum for scholars, media personalities, military personnel, bureaucrats and politicians from the region to express their views and thinking on the subject at hand. During the course of the seminar, an interesting mix of political vision, academic analyses, and hands-on experience of journalists and the military, interwoven with some very stimulating discussions on issues vital to the North East, were observed. The seminar, a novel gesture on the part of the IDSA in the region, registered strong local interest and media coverage. The inaugural session was aired on live television throughout the North East.
In his welcome address, H. V. Lalringa, Secretary, NEC, appreciated the IDSA's gesture and stated that the seminar could not have come at a more appropriate time given the ongoing Naga Peace Process and its likely positive impact on peace in other states of the region. IDSA Director, N. S. Sisodia, identified the North East as one of the most important regions of India, given its strategic location, its rich culture and an abundance of natural resources. Tapping the human and economic potential would be extremely beneficial for the region and would also at the same time open the doors for cross border linkages with an economically vibrant South-East Asia. He stressed on the importance of peace and development in the North East and indicated that the seminar was the start of a process for further cementing bonds with institutes and universities in the region.
In his inaugural address, P. R. Kyndiah, Union Cabinet Minister for Tribal Affairs and Development of North Eastern Region, pointed out the deep concerns about the foreign nexus in aiding North Eastern insurgent groups set up sanctuaries in neighbouring countries. He expressed satisfaction with the Centre's efforts in engaging in peace talks with rebel groups and hoped that the North East would witness higher economic activity with various developmental schemes in place. R. G. Lyngdoh, Home Minister in the Government of Meghalaya, spoke against any governmental incentives to surrendered militants. He candidly argued that such packages indirectly encourage youths to take up the gun and later surrender in the hope of enjoying government-funded benefits.
The broad topics covered in the Seminar included: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, Identity and Conflict, Peace and Development, and The Way Ahead.
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency
The IDSA has dealt with topics of defence and strategic issues related to the North East since its inception. Dr. Pushpita Das, an Associate Fellow at the IDSA, gave an excellent overview of the work that has been done at the Institute in this regard. The earliest publication in the IDSA journal was the paper titled "Perspectives from Nagaland" by Prof. B. K. Roy Burman, which analysed the Naga insurgency in two contexts - South East Asia and India. In its early years, the Institute also published three papers on the Sino-Indian imbroglio with a focus on Arunachal Pradesh. In subsequent years, the IDSA has followed these up with several in-depth articles, papers, monographs and books, all primarily dealing with insurgency and security.
Insurgency in the North East thrives on cross border flows of finance and small arms. As a result, when the stock market in South East Asia crashed in the late 1990s, some of the biggest losers were insurgent outfits of the North East. The 'economy' created by these outfits collects revenue through parallel taxes, extortion, ransom, foreign aid, profit sharing with corporate houses, siphoning off state developmental funds and arms and narcotics trade. These issues were brought out by Prof. Sajal Nag of Assam University, Silchar, in his paper titled "Financing the Resistance: Political Economy of Insurgency and the Structure of Non-State Economy in North East India."
Prof. K. Ibo Singh's (Manipur University) paper on "Insurgency in Northeast India and India's Neighbours" was an excellent recap of the trans-border network feeding the insurgency in the region. Insurgency in the region thrives on several external linkages and connections with contiguous countries. The unfortunate attitude of Dhaka is manifest in active shelter and support to militants of the region bolstered by the 'sworn India hater' - Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence (ISI). The Myanmar connection is kind of 'traditional' with the base provided by the World War II 'veterans' lineage in the form of the American trained and armed Kachin militants. However, Myanmar's current interface with North East outfits is provided by S. S. Khaplang's faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, a rather easy task given the porous nature of the Indo-Myanmar boundary.
Another important paper "The Changing Scenario of Insurgents in Manipur" by Prof. Joykumar Singh (Manipur University) reflected on the existing 'culture of violence' in Manipur today. In his view, revolutionary activities by the youth are motivated by a feeling of desolation resulting from the Indian state's inability to bring about meaningful assimilation of identities and culture. Also, non-violent protests against the Government of India's decision to situate Manipur within the categorty 'C' states gradually spiralled into violence and separatist tendencies. Referring to the concept of the 'moral efficacy of violence', Prof. Singh lucidly argued that New Delhi's lacklustre response to non-violent dissent has radicalised the youth and forced them to conclude that violent movements get attention whereas non-violent protests do not.
The North East of India abounds in 'social capital' within the civil society discourse, which can be vitally used for peace and development. This is a resource that is almost unexplored and therefore untapped. However, this concept has a downside because even though there are strong bonds among smaller groups based on kinship and tribal affiliation, it is weaker in larger groups. The remedy lies in better communications, which creates bonds on shared values and issues, impacting upon the larger group. This perspective was expertly dealt with in the paper titled "Role of Civil Society" by Dr. Archana Upadhyay from Dibrugarh University. A case in point is the Naga reconciliation moves and the growth of a common sense of purpose.
Identity and Conflict
The first paper under this theme titled "'Acculturative Stress and Identity in National Minority of the North-Eastern India" by Dr Zokaitluangi from Mizoram University dealt with issues of identity, attitudes, values and adjustment from acculturation based on a study of five hundred and thirty five Mizo students. It makes interesting inter-scale/sub-scale factor analysis on psychological measures. These measures are analysed with the help of multiple regression analyses on three independent components of acculturation, namely, heritage acculturation, mainstream acculturation and the resultant acculturative stress. Acculturation is the process when two or more cultures with different origins, behavioural traits and lifestyles interact continuously and directly leading to the process of adaptation. Heritage refers to an individual/group's culture of origin, mainstream indicates the 'other' dominant culture that an individual/group comes across besides the heritage culture, and acculturative stress arises on account of the process of adaptation by an individual/group with the mainstream culture. This is especially true for a minority due to the consequences of identity conflict and ethnic values. A case in point is the Naga identity and conflict arising out of acculturative stress. This identity stress has been for long a bone of contention due to rigid posturing by both parties to the issue.
Dr. Nani Mahanta of Gauhati University debated on the necessity of an interface between policy makers, insurgent leaders and civil society. He argued that civil society could be a third face if consultations between the first two sections reach a deadlock. Dr. S. Bhattacharejee of Tripura University provided a detailed perspective based on identity complexities in Tripura, where the differences between tribal/non-tribal identities are an everyday reality. Professors A. L. Ao and A. K. Singh's "Identity and Conflict: Nagaland Perspective" emphasised on the Naga issue from a critical standpoint. The authors claim that the Nagas are a separate nation, with a distinctive culture and lifestyle and that the so-called Naga 'insurgency' is actually a movement to preserve and protect this distinct identity.
The Naga crisis draws its strength and supposed legitimacy from a historical baseline. This was examined vis-à-vis the other more contemporary contributing factors to the crisis in the paper titled 'Contested Domain of the Naga Narrative', by the author of these impressions. Based on historical evidence, the author argued that the Naga claims of uniqueness and distinctive identity do not hold true, given that Naga tribes had strong linkages with the Meitheis of Manipur and the Ahoms of Assam. Moreover, the British had occupied their lands by the end of the 19th century and established an administrative set up in the Naga Hills.
The speed and relative ease with which the Indo-US nuclear deal raced through the respective committees of Congress and the margin by which it was assented to by the House of Representatives on 27 July, scarcely four months after it was introduced in Congress, created the expectation that the same scenario would play out in the Senate. These hopes have been belied by the failure of the Senate to pass the Bill before it recessed for the mid-term elections.
One perception of this development is that Senators were not fully signed on to President Bush's vision of a strategic partnership with India, and its benefits for the United States, and therefore put the brakes on the deal by bringing up procedural hurdles. A closer examination of the sequence of events shows that the outcome could largely be attributed to happenstance - a series of events and outcomes that looks like they might have been arranged even though they were really accidental.
The Bush initiative got a very tepid welcome in Congress, not out of opposition to the bill per se, but as a consequence of the internal dynamics of the relationship between the legislature and the executive. There was a perception that the Administration had ridden rough-shod over the legislature, first negotiating a Bill without due consultation, presenting it to Congress as a fait accompli, and then trying to rush the legislation through, which Congress saw as trampling on its fundamental right of advise and consent.
The momentum picked up once lobby groups impressed on the Congressional leadership that dragging their feet on the bill would have a negative impact on the burgeoning economic relations between the two countries. Vocal protestations to the proposed legislation from the non-proliferation lobby notwithstanding, there wasn't much opposition to the Bill from amongst the rank and file of Congress for whom the legislation was neither a political hot potato nor electorally significant - important factors to be considered in a year of mid-term Congressional elections. Added to this were sustained lobbying efforts by a number of groups, ranging from the Indian American community, the business communities of the two countries, fronted by their respective business alliances, and think tanks, especially those with a focus on South Asia. Though officially maintaining that getting the deal through Congress was an internal task to be undertaken by the US Administration, the Government of India, as an interested party, also made an effort to reach out to legislators, recognizing their position as a separate centre of power.
Subsequently, the bill fell victim to its own success with a controversial legislation being tagged onto it, the intention being to ride piggyback on the more popular bill. (Incidentally, the same mechanism had initially been proposed to get the Nuclear Bill through Congress if it had struck too many roadblocks.) This plan backfired with a number of Senators putting a "hold" on the combined legislation, thus preventing it from reaching the floor of the House. By the time the combined efforts of the Indian American community and the business lobbies had succeeded to remove that particular hurdle, a paucity of time coupled with a crowded legislative calendar and pending legislation related to domestic (and electorally important) issues took centre stage, leaving the India bill out in the cold. Bills that were passed in the last days of the current Congress ranged from the defence spending bill to the homeland security spending bill to a bill authorising further fencing along US-Mexico border. President Bush himself had other priorities such as getting the bill allowing military commissions to prosecute terrorism suspects through Congress.
Renewed attempts to expedite its passage at the very end of the session were stymied by the Democrats for a number of reasons. They were determined to deny the Republicans a foreign policy victory just before the elections, and given that they are widely expected to reduce the Republican majority in the Senate and to even gain a majority in the House, a re-look and possibly a refashioning of the Bill seems to be in their scheme of things. If this turn of events comes to pass, the Bill would be on slippery ground since the ideological underpinnings of the Democrats makes them more receptive to the exhortations of the non-proliferation lobby, evident from the voting on the Bill in the House where out of the 68 who voted against the Bill, 58 were Democrats.
If the Bill is not passed in the current session and once again has to run the gauntlet of the Committees, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns' prediction in March that getting the Bill through Congress would be akin to a 15 round (boxing) match might well turn out to be the understatement of the year, given the lack of room for manoeuvre for both the US Administration and the Indian government. The muted response on the part of the Indian government to the delay is an indication of the maturation of relations at a governmental level. But domestic competitive politics coupled with media hype has given a much higher profile to the deal in India than in the United States. If the deal were to fail to pass through in the lame duck session as well, it might still leave a manageable impact on bi-lateral relations. However, it would be a public relations disaster for the United States, in one of the few countries where public opinion sees US actions in the recent past in a favourable light. As the James Bond villain Auric Goldfinger famously said, "Once is happenstance, Twice is coincidence, The third time it's enemy action." The looming danger is that the public might skip from one to three.
